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STATEMENT OF RELATED CASKS 
Appellants previously attempted to appeal the trial court's ruling precluding them 
from pursuing claims for severance damages. See Utah Court of Appeals case no. 
20031016CA. That appeal was dismissed upon the court's sua sponte motion for 
summary disposition. The court ruled the order from which appellants appealed was not 
an order eligible for certification under Rule 54(b), UTAH R. CIV. P. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE 
ANN. §78-2-2 (3)(j). The Utah Supreme Court has transferred this appeal to the Utah 
Court of Appeals pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2-2(4). The Utah Court of Appeals 
has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2a-3(2)(j). 
IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES 
Appellants are James Ivers, Katherine G. Havas, and P and F Food Services, 
referred to herein collectively as "Arby's." Appellee is Utah Department of 
Transportation, referred to herein as "UDOT." 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
• Can Arby's be precluded from seeking severance damages based upon the 
reduction in value of its commercial property resulting from the loss of reasonable access 
to its remaining property by reason of UDOT's construction project to which Arby's 
condemned property has been dedicated? 
• Can Arby's be precluded from seeking severance damages based upon the 
reduction in value of its commercial property resulting from the obstruction of view 
1 
(infringement upon appurtenant property rights of light, air and view)1 by reason of 
UDOT's construction project to which Arby's condemned property has been dedicated? 
STANDARD OF RFVIFW 
The appellate court reviews the district court's summary judgment ruling for 
correctness, granting no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. See Woodbury 
Amsource, Inc. v. Salt Lake County, 73 P.3d 362, 364 (Utah 2003), Kouris v. Utah 
Highway Patrol, 70 P.3d 72 (Utah 2003); Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407 (Utah App. 1990). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITITTIONAI 
PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
• Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution: "[N]or shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation." 
• Article I, §22, Utah Constitution: "Private property shall not be taken or 
damaged for public use without just compensation." 
• UTAH CODE ANN. §78-34-10: 
The court, jury or referee must hear such legal evidence as 
may be offered by any of the parties to the proceedings, and 
thereupon must ascertain and assess: 
(2) if the property sought to be condemned 
constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the damages which 
will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned by 
reason of its severance from the portion sought to be 
condemned and the construction of the improvement in the 
manner proposed by the plaintiff; 
Arby's contends in this case that the loss of view from its property and the loss 
of visibility of the property are both compensable. The trial court's ruling did not 
distinguish between these two aspects of visibility. 
2 
(3) if the property, though no part is taken, will be 
damaged by the construction of the proposed improvement, 
the amount of such damages; 
(4) separately, how much the portion not sought to 
be condemned . . . will be benefited, if at all, by the 
construction of the improvement proposed by the plaintiff.... 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
Prior to UDOT's construction project, Arby's had operated a restaurant for many 
years on the northwest corner of a busy intersection located at U.S. 89 and Shepard Lane 
in a commercial area of Farmington, Utah. This case involves Arby's claims for 
severance damages suffered in connection with a partial taking of Arby's property for 
incorporation into UDOT's construction project. UDOT's construction project has cut 
off reasonable access to Arby's remaining commercial property and has also eliminated 
the property's view and visibility due to the fact UDOT's project was built well above 
grade. The trial court, in a ruling dated May 22, 2003, denied Arby's motion for partial 
summary judgment and granted UDOT's motion in limine on the issue of severance 
damages. Arby's contends the trial court erred in its application of the law, and Arby's 
should be permitted to seek severance damages in this matter. A jury should consider 
whether the value of Arby's remaining commercial property has been decreased because 
of UDOT's construction project, which necessarily incorporated the parcel UDOT took 
from Arby's. 
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II. Course of Proceedings 
Arby's filed a motion for summary judgment and UDOT filed a motion in limine 
on the issue of whether Arby's could seek to recover severance damages in this case. The 
trial court determined Arby's cannot seek to recover severance damages for loss of access 
or loss of view. That ruling was certified by the trial court under Rule 54(b), UTAH R. 
Civ. P., and Arby's filed a notice of appeal. This court, upon a sua sponte motion to 
dismiss, dismissed the appeal on the basis the trial court's order, at that stage of the 
proceedings, was not eligible for certification. Thereafter, the parties resolved certain 
limited issues and stipulated to a final judgment, dated February 22, 2005, opening the 
door for Arby's to finally pursue this appeal on the remaining issues concerning 
severance damages. 
III. Disposition in Trial Court 
A final judgment was entered by the trial court on February 22, 2005, pursuant to 
stipulation by the parties. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The trial court entered its May 22, 2003 ruling based upon the following 
undisputed facts: 
1. The subject Arby's property is commercial real estate currently used for 
operation of an Arby's fast food restaurant. Ruling on Plaintiffs Motion in Limine and 
9 
For convenience, a copy of the court's May 22, 2003 ruling is included as the 
addendum to this brief. 
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on Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("Ruling"), Record at p. 152, 
paragraph 3 (the record on appeal is referred to herein as "R"). 
2. The Arby's property is located on the northwest corner of what was 
previously a traditional intersection located at U.S. 89 and Shepard Lane in Farmington, 
Utah. Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion in Limine and in 
Support of Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("Arby's Opp. Memo."), 
R. atp. 72. 
3. The total size of Arby's small commercial site is .416 acres. Arby's Opp. 
Memo., R. at p. 76, paragraph 1. 
4. UDOT condemned a .048 acre portion of Arby's property in fee. UDOT's 
Acreage Summary, R. at p. 11. 
5. The express purpose of UDOT's taking of Arby's real property was "for the 
widening of an expressway State Route 89 . . . ." Condemnation Resolution, R. at p. 6. 
6. The portion of Arby's property UDOT condemned was used for 
construction of the grade-separated configuration at U.S. 89/Shepard Lane. See, 
generally, diagrams attached to UDOT's Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine 
("UDOT's Mot. Lim."), R. at pp. 55-61. Specifically, the 0.048 acres of Arby's 
condemned land was used to construct a one-way frontage road immediately parallel to 
the newly expanded and elevated U.S. 89. Ruling, R. at p. 152, paragraph 4. 
7. As a result of UDOT's construction project, the intersection at U.S. 
89/Shepard Lane has been eliminated. U.S. 89, immediately east of Arby's property, has 
been elevated so that traffic traveling east-west on Shepard Lane can now travel under 
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U.S. 89. Id. at p. 151, paragraph 1. Arby's contends the newly elevated U.S. 89 
expressway obstructs the property's view to the east. Additionally, Arby's property and 
signage cannot be seen as a result of the now-constructed, elevated U.S. 89. Arby's 
Memo. Opp., R. at p. 79, paragraph 10. 
8. Direct access to Arby's property from U.S. 89 has been cut off as a result of 
the construction project. Access exists at points that are one-half mile away from Arby's 
property and will be circuitous. Access to Arby's property from Shepard Lane is 
unchanged. Ruling, R. at p. 152, paragraph 5. 
9. A preliminary traffic study conducted for Arby's by Horrocks Engineers 
prior to UDOT's construction predicted the new U.S. 89/Shepard Lane configuration 
would reduce traffic and adversely impact the Arby's property. At the time of the traffic 
study, seventy percent of Arby's traffic came from northbound and southbound U.S. 89. 
Horrocks Engineers opined there would be a total loss of about 40% of Arby's daily trip 
traffic after the elevated U.S. 89 was completed. Horrocks Engineers Preliminary Traffic 
Study ('Traffic Study"), R. at pp. 116-118. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This case involves a partial taking of Arby's property and the resulting severance 
damages. Arby's is entitled, under fundamental constitutional principles and the express 
provisions of Utah's condemnation statutes, to put on all of its evidence of severance 
damages resulting from the condemnation and the construction of improvements on the 
condemned portion of Arby's property. The case of State of Utah v. Harvey Real Estate, 
57 P.3d 1088 (Utah 2002), upon which the trial court relied in ruling that Arby's cannot 
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put on evidence of severance damages, is clearly distinguishable and leaves many 
unanswered questions that do not address issues in the present case. The analysis of how 
the value of Arby's remaining property is impacted should include change in access and 
loss of visibility resulting from UDOT's construction of the improvement. The trial court 
erred in ruling Arby's cannot present evidence of such severance damages at trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. 
SEVERANCE DAMAGES ARE RECOVERABLE 
PURSUANT TO CONSTITUTION AND STATUTE 
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America 
expressly provides private property may not be taken for public use without just 
compensation. Similarly, Article I, §22 of Utah's constitution states: "Private property 
shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." Severance 
damages are part of the constitutional requirement of just compensation. "Just 
compensation" means the "full and perfect equivalent in money of the property taken. 
The owner is to be put in as good position pecuniarily as he would have occupied if his 
property had not been taken." United States v. Miller, 63 S. Ct. 276, 279-80 (1942). 
In connection with the government's condemnation of private property, UTAH 
CODE ANN. §78-34-10(2) requires the trier of fact to hear legal evidence to ascertain and 
assess: 
[I]f the property to be condemned constitutes only part of a 
larger parcel, the damages which will accrue to the portion 
not sought to be condemned by reason of its severance from 
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the portion sought to be condemned and the construction of 
the improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff. . . .3 
In the present matter, part of Arby's property was taken to make the elimination of 
the U.S. 89/Shepard Lane intersection possible. The property taken by UDOT has been 
used in UDOT's construction project in such a way to allow U.S. 89 to be elevated over 
Shepard Lane and eliminate the intersection at that location. If not for U.S. 89's elevation 
over Shepard Lane, there would have been absolutely no need for UDOT to take Arby's 
property. In fact, UDOT has admitted the construction of a frontage road on Arby's 
property was "necessary to UDOT's proposed restructuring of Highway 89." UDOT's 
Mot. Lim., R. at p. 44. The damage caused to the balance of Arby's property is causally 
related to the construction of improvements upon, and UDOT's use of, the property taken 
from Arby's. 
The end result of eliminating the intersection and elevating U.S. 89 clearly reduces 
the value of Arby's commercial property. The property is no longer accessible from the 
new, elevated U.S. 89 and there is no reasonable access to Arby's property via the new 
frontage road system that is part of UDOT's construction project. Additionally, the 
The Utah statute also states that even in cases where property is not taken, the 
trier of fact must hear evidence of whether the property is being damaged, and the amount 
of such damage. UTAH CODE ANN. §78-34-10(3). 
It is also interesting to note a condemning authority, in an effort to reduce the 
amount of compensation paid for a taking, has the ability to introduce evidence of how 
the portion of property not taken is benefited by the proposed improvement. Utah's 
condemnation statutes should be applied fairly. If UDOT has the right to put on evidence 
showing how property is benefited by an improvement, Arby's should have the right to 
show how the property is damaged by UDOT's improvement. 
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eastern view from Arby's remaining property is blocked and the view of the restaurant 
and its signage is obstructed because of the newly elevated U.S. 89 expressway. These 
factors certainly reduce the fair market value of the remaining commercial property and 
Arby's should be allowed to put on evidence of severance damages. 
POINT2. 
THE HARVEY REAL ESTATE CASE IS 
DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE PRESENT MATTER 
UDOT and the trial court have relied heavily in this case upon the Utah Supreme 
Court decision in State of Utah v. Harvey Real Estate, 57 P.3d 1088 (Utah 2002). This is 
apparently because the facts of Harvey Real Estate also involved the U.S. 89 expansion in 
Davis County, although the precise location is north of the commercial area surrounding 
the U.S. 89/Shepard Lane intersection involved in the present matter. Harvey Real Estate 
also involved the issue of an intersection closure and direct access from the undeveloped 
property to U.S. 89 being eliminated and substituted with a frontage road system. Harvey 
Real Estate and the present matter were also presided over by the same trial court judge, 
Michael Allphin. 
The trial court's application of Harvey Real Estate to the present matter is 
inconsistent with the basis principle that each case should be decided upon its own set of 
facts. See Tasters Ltd., Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 863 P.2d 12, 19 (UT 
App. 1993) ("It is elementary that each case should be decided on its own particular set of 
facts."). What the trial court and UDOT have failed to realize in this case is that there are 
significant distinctions between Harvey Real Estate and the present matter that should not 
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be disregarded merely because of a few basic similarities between the two cases. The 
important issues that make the present case peculiar are not addressed in Harvey Real 
Estate. For one example, Harvey Real Estate did not involve an elevated construction 
project that blocks a commercial property's view and ability to be seen. However, the 
issue of appurtenant property rights does exist in the present matter.4 
The basic distinctions between the present matter and Harvey Real Estate can be 
summarized as follows: 
1 HARVEY REAL ESTATE 
Involved undeveloped property with little 
or no commercial value. 
Total acreage: 160 acres. 
Amount of acreage taken: 1.36 acres 
(less than 1% of the total). 
Property was vacant. 
Property not located in a commercial area. 
The case did not involve a grade elevation 
of U.S. 89. There was no issue regarding 
loss of view, light and air. 
Involved closing Old Mountain Road's 
access to U.S. 89, which was essentially a 
closure of an old frontage road. 
ARBY'S 
Involves a small pad of existing developed 
commercial property. 
Total acreage: .418 acres. 
Amount of acreage taken: .048 acres (11% 
of the total). 
Property contains a twelve-year old Arby's 
restaurant. 
Property located in commercial area. 
U.S. 89 has been elevated above grade 
immediately east of Arby's property so that 
Shepard Lane can be routed under U.S. 89. 
The eastern view from Arby's remaining 
property has been blocked. 
Involves the elimination of a traditional 
four-way intersection, controlled by 
semaphores. 
The issues of visibility are discussed in Point 4 below. 
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Large tract of land with only 85 feet of 
property abutting Old Mountain Road, 
which was closed. 
No impact to value of remaining vacant 
"property. 
Small commercial pad located on the north 
west corner of the intersection eliminated 
by UDOT. 
The taking threatens the viability of Arby's 
commercial property interest. 
See Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
("Arby's Reply"), R. at p. 188. 
The comparison above clearly shows there are significant differences between the 
two cases, which justify careful consideration. For example, UDOT has downplayed, and 
the trial court has disregarded, the commercial vs. non-commercial property distinction 
between this case and Harvey Real Estate. However, even in a case relied upon in the 
trial court's ruling, the court held the fact property is located in a busy commercial area 
enters into a determination whether impairment of the right of access is substantial. See 
People v. Becker, 69 Cal. Rptr. 110, 114 (4th Dist. 1968). 
POINT 3. 
ARBY'S SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO SEEK 
SEVERANCE DAMAGES FOR LOSS OF ACCESS 
With respect to the issue of loss of reasonable access negatively impacting the 
value of Arby's remaining property, the trial court essentially adopted UDOT's request to 
impose a universal rule, derived from Harvey Real Estate, that whenever property is taken 
to construct a frontage road on U.S. 89, the frontage road should be found to constitute 
reasonable access to the remainder of the condemnee's property. Such a rule is certainly 
convenient for a condemning authority's purposes but should not be accepted as a matter 
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of routine. As illustrated in Point 2 above, each condemnation case involves different 
property presenting varying facts. Just because the court rejected severance damages in 
Harvey Real Estate does not mean a blanket rule now exists to deny compensation in 
every other case involving the construction of a frontage road in connection with the U.S. 
89 project in Davis County. 
With respect to the loss of access issue in this case, one of the fundamental 
problems with the trial court's analysis is its willingness to assume "reasonable access to 
Arby's" exists (see Ruling, R. at p. 155), even after the intersection was closed and U.S. 
89 was rebuilt to by-pass Arby's property. The question of reasonableness is a 
quintessential factual question. See County of Anoka v. Esmailzadeh, 498 N.W.2d 58, 61 
(Minn. App. 1993) (what constitutes reasonable access depends upon nature of property, 
therefore, the existence of reasonable access is a question of fact). The court's finding of 
reasonableness of access at such a premature stage in the present matter was based purely 
upon the fact reasonable access had been found to exist in the distinguishable Harvey 
Real Estate case. 
Based upon the particular facts and circumstances of the present case, the access to 
the Arby's property post-construction is not reasonable. In fact, consistent with the traffic 
study conducted prior to UDOT's construction , if allowed to do so, Arby's would put on 
evidence at trial showing that since construction, the amount of business it conducts has 
decreased dramatically, indicating a loss of access. Arby's contends this is tied directly to 
5
 See Traffic Study, R. at pp. 116-118. 
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the new condition where traffic bypasses the Arby's property. Even in a case cited in the 
trial court's ruling, the court held the loss of business and traffic may be admissible to 
establish that property has been damaged. See Filler v. City ofMinot, 281 N.W.2d 237, 
243 (N.D. 1979). Arby's should be allowed to put on such evidence in this case. 
The trial court also erred in its application of the causation analysis of Harvey Real 
Estate. The court focused upon language from Harvey Real Estate stating the claimant in 
that case could not show "any damage sustained by the closure of the intersection [had] 
been caused by the severance of its land." Ruling, R. at p. 154 (citing Harvey Real 
Estate, 57 P.3d at 1091). Contrary to the trial court's ruling, there is a sufficient causal 
connection between the taking of the Arby's property and damage to the remaining 
property due to loss of reasonable access. Arby's reiterates the only way for the U.S. 
89/Shepard Lane intersection to be eliminated and for U.S. 89 to be expanded and 
elevated, was for UDOT to take the Arby's property for construction of a one-way 
frontage road. That frontage road, built upon property taken from Arby's, runs 
immediately parallel to the newly elevated U.S. 89 and abuts Arby's remaining property. 
In short, Arby's property has been incorporated into the precise improvement that has 
caused the loss of access. In the present case, it cannot be argued the taking of Arby's 
property was only "somewhat related. . . ." Harvey Real Estate, 57 P.3d at 1019. Arby's 
property was taken to have improvements constructed thereon that severely decrease the 
value of the remaining portion of the Arby's commercial property. As the Utah Supreme 
Court stated previously: "To suggest that any entity granted the right of eminent domain 
could design its project without regard to the effect that project would have on adjacent 
13 
land is to deny the very purpose of the compensation statutes. Utah Dept. of Tramp, v. 
Jones, 694 P.2d 1031, 1034 (Utah 1984). 
POINT 4. 
ARBY'S SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO SEEK SEVERANCE 
DAMAGES FOR LOSS OF APPURTENANT RIGHTS 
As referenced in the trial court's ruling, Arby's claims the change in grade of U.S. 
89 takes away its eastern view from its remaining property and the ability of the Arby's 
restaurant to be seen by potential customers. However, the trial court's ruling fails to 
make a distinction between these two aspects of loss of view. Both should be found 
compensable. 
A. Loss of View From Arby's Property 
Based upon Utah State Road Comm'n. v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926 (Utah 1974), even 
UDOT has acknowledged an exception to its argument concerning severance damages, 
where rights such as air, light and view appurtenant to the property are taken or 
significantly impacted by actions off the property. UDOT's Mot. Lim., R. at p. 50. 
In Miya, real property, most of which was already subject to a government 
easement, was taken to construct a new viaduct and frontage road. The new viaduct 
obstructed the view from the condemnee's adjacent residential building lots. The Utah 
Supreme Court in Miya acknowledged "one of the rights appurtenant to abutting property 
is that of receiving light and air . . . and an abutting owner is entitled to compensation for 
6
 In Branson v. Berea, 293 N.E.2d 577, 583 (Ohio 1971), a case cited by the trial 
court in its ruling, the Ohio court held the right of view includes the right to be seen as 
well as the right to see. 
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infringement of his right to light and air by a structure in the highway. . . ." Miya, 526 
P.2d at 929 (citation omitted). The court went on to hold "[a]n owner of land abutting on 
a street is also in possession of an easement in view, which constitutes a property right 
which may not be taken without just compensation." Id. 
With respect to its analysis and application of the Miya decision, the trial court in 
this matter acknowledged correctly "the damage caused by the obstruction of view need 
not fit into the 'special and unique' category . . . since an easement of view is a 
compensable, appurtenant property right in and of itself." Ruling, R. at p. 157. However, 
despite Arby's clear rights under the Miya decision, the trial court added an entirely new 
element that was not part of the analysis in Miya. The trial court ruled that because the 
specific portion of UDOT's project creating the obstruction was not actually constructed 
directly upon the property taken from Arby's, there could be no severance damages claim 
for loss of view. Ruling, R. at p. 158. 
While Miya involved the taking of easement-burdened property, upon which the 
obstruction was built, there is no language in Miya requiring the obstruction be built upon 
property taken before an abutting property owner could seek compensation for loss of 
view. The Miya decision itself holds: "The rights of access, light, and air are easements 
appurtenant to the land of an abutting owner on a street; they constitute property rights 
forming part of the owner's estate. These substantial property rights . . . may not be taken 
away or impaired without just compensation." Miya, 526 P.2d at 928. With respect to the 
erection of a permanent structure within a public highway, the Miya court ruled that even 
if such an improvement diminishes the value of abutting property, there is no damage in 
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the constitutional sense "unless the structure violates some right appurtenant to the 
abutting property." Id. at 929. The supreme court then pointed out "one of the rights 
appurtenant to abutting property is that of receiving light and air from the highway, and 
an abutting owner is entitled to compensation for infringement of his right to light and air 
by a structure in the highway, even if it is a proper highway use." Id. (emphasis added). 
Even if there were a requirement that the obstructing improvement be built upon 
property taken in order to recover for loss of view, Arby's submits the court should reject 
UDOT's narrow description of its improvement, which was adopted by the trial court. 
Although the elevated portion of the U.S. 89 improvement is not built directly upon 
property taken from Arby's, the one-way frontage road that immediately parallels U.S. 89 
and abuts Arby's remaining property is a critical component of UDOT's project and was 
built upon Arby's condemned property. In other words, if the scope of UDOT's project is 
viewed realistically, the construction on Arby's property is part and parcel of the 
construction that obstructs visibility. UDOT should not be allowed to avoid paying 
Arby's for compensable harm by unilaterally defining its construction project in such an 
unreasonably narrow manner. 
B. Toss of Visibility of Arby's Property. 
The cases cited in the court's ruling are primarily cases dealing with whether a 
property owner has a compensable right to be seen, as opposed to loss of view. For 
example, in Filler v. Minot, 281 N.W.2d 237 (N.D. 1979), the North Dakota court 
followed the cases where courts had ruled there is no compensable right to be seen from 
an abutting highway. Id. at 244. However, the trial court ignored the portion of that same 
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ruling where the court acknowledged it had allowed landowners compensation for loss of 
the right of view from their property. Id. In another case, People v. Wasserman, 50 Cal. 
Rptr. 95 (1st Dist. 1966), the court acknowledged the "well-settled" rule that the owner of 
real property abutting a public highway has an easement of reasonable view of his 
property from the highway and that impairment of that view infringes upon a valuable 
property right. Id. at 105. However, the court in Wasserman denied compensation 
because the improvement that obstructed the property's ability to be seen was not built on 
property taken from the landowner. Id. 
While ignored or rejected by the trial court, there is also authority from other 
jurisdictions that the loss of visibility is compensable even when the improvement 
causing the obstruction is not built upon property taken from the landowner. In United 
California Bank v. State of California, 81 Cal. Rptr. 405 (2n Dist. 1969), an inverse 
condemnation case, the court approved compensation for loss of exposure of commercial 
land due to construction of an underpass on land not owned by the commercial property 
owner. See also Goycoolea v. City of Los Angeles, 24 Cal. Rptr. 719, 724 (2nd Dist. 1962) 
The trial court also relied upon the following cases for the same proposition that 
loss of visibility of property is compensable only when the obstruction is built on property 
taken from the landowner: 8,960 Square Feet v. State of Alaska, 806 P.2d 843 (Alaska 
1991) and People v. Becker, 69 Cal. Rptr. 110 (4th Dist. 1968). 
In People v. Riccardi, 144 P.2d 799 (Cal 1944), a case not cited by the trial court, 
the California Supreme Court acknowledged the weight of authority is uin favor of the 
proposition that an abutting owner of property on a public highway has an easement of 
reasonable view of his property from the highway." Id. at 806. Riccardi was a 
condemnation case where the appellate court affirmed judgment in favor of the property 
owners. 
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(an abutting land owner has an easement of light and air with respect to street in front of 
is land, and also has an easement of reasonable view of his property from the street or 
highway). The A.L.R. cited by the trial court in its ruling also discusses that in 
California, there is a split among the intermediate courts of appeal on the issue of whether 
loss of visibility resulting from an improvement of or on property not taken from the 
claimant property owner is compensable in a direct or indirect condemnation case. See 
Annotation, Eminent Domain: Compensability of Loss of Visibility of Owner's Property, 
7 A.L.R. 5m 113 (1992), at Section 7. In short, even in cases where the obstruction does 
not occur on property taken from the property owner, there is authority supporting 
compensation for loss of the ability to be seen. At any rate, as argued hereinabove, 
Arby's contends the improvement built upon its condemned property is part and parcel of 
the improvement that now prevents the visibility of the Arby's restaurant and signage. 
The resulting loss of visibility, along with loss of view, should be found compensable in 
this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Arby's has important constitutional rights that are being denied because of the trial 
court's ruling on severance damages. Based upon the foregoing, the court should reverse 
the trial court's ruling and allow Arby's to pursue its severance damages claims based 
upon loss of reasonable access and loss of view. 
1* 
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ADDENDUM 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 




JAMES IVERS; KATHERINE G. HAVAS; 
P and F FOOD SERVICES (Tenant); and 
ZIONS CREDIT CORPORATION, 
Defendants. 
RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION IN LIMINE AND ON 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 020700665 
Judge Michael Allphin 
The above-entitled matter having come before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion in Limine 
and Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; and the Court having reviewed the 
Motions; and the Objections thereto; and the Replies thereto; and the Court being fully advised 
in the premises enters the following findings of fact, and rules as follows. 
BACKGROUND 
The matter before the Court concerns a taking of private property by the Utah Department 
of Transportation to construct a new frontage road to U.S. Highway 89 near Farmington, Utah. 
Plaintiff filed a Complaint on December 20, 2002. Plaintiffs Motion in Limine was filed on 
March 14, 2003. Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to the Plaintiffs Motion in Limine 
and in Support of Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was filed on April 1, 2003. 
Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Request for Oral Argument was also 
filed on April 1, 2003. Plaintiffs Response to Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment and Reply to the Defendants' Response to the Plaintiffs Motion in Limine was filed 
on April 14, 2003. Defendants' Reply Memorandum in support of Defendants' Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment was filed on May 1, 2003. Notices to Submit for Decision and 
Requests for Oral Argument were filed by Plaintiff and Defendants on May 7 and May 9 
respectively. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Court finds the following facts relevant to the Court's Ruling: 
1. The Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) plans to eliminate the intersection of 
Shepard Lane and Highway 89 by elevating Highway 89 over Shepard Lane to decrease 
the number of accidents in the intersection.. 
2. UDOT seeks to condemn 0.048 acres of Defendants' property in fee and a temporary 
easement of 0.001 acres of Defendants' property. 
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3. The property is currently leased to P and F Food Services and is occupied by an Arby's 
fast food restaurant. The lease will likely terminate as a result of the taking of 
Defendants' land. 
4. The 0.048 acres of condemned land will be used to construct a frontage road to U.S. 
Highway 89 and will not be elevated itself. 
5. Direct access to Defendants' property from Highway 89 will be cut off as a result of the 
construction. Access from the highway will then exist at points that are one-half mile 
away from Defendants' property and will be circuitous. Access to Defendants' property 
from Shepard Lane will remain unchanged. 
6. A Farmington City ordinance requires a landscaped strip not less than 10 feet in width to 
be maintained along property lines. 
ANALYSIS 
Plaintiffs Motion in Limine was to preclude evidence of severance damages or loss in 
market value to the Defendants' remaining property caused by the taking of the land described 
above and the highway reconstruction project. Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment was to secure an order allowing Defendants to present evidence of severance damages 
caused by the reconstruction of Highway 89. In regards to takings, U.C.A. 78-34-10 provides in 
part the following: 
The court, jury or referee must hear such legal evidence as may be offered by any 
of the parties to the proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain and assess: (2) if 
the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the 
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damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned by reason 
of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned and the construction of 
the improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that Section 78-34-10 gives a landowner the right to present 
evidence of damages caused by the severance alone or the construction of the improvement made 
on the severed property, but that it does not give the landowner the right to ^resent evidence of 
damages caused by other facets of the construction project. State v. Harvey Real Estate, 57 P.3d 
1088, 1090 (Utah 2002). 
The Defendants support their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and oppose 
Plaintiffs Motion in Limine by arguing that (1) reasonable access to defendants1 property will be 
eliminated by the new construction, reducing the fair market value of the remaining property; (2) 
the change in grade of U.S. Highway 89, which takes away Arby's eastern view and ability to be 
viewed by potential customers, is compensable; (3) the inability to comply with city zoning 
ordinances will also impact the fair market value of the property; (4) and the lease agreement 
among the defendants may be terminated due to the impact of the condemnation. The Court 
agrees with Plaintiff that termination of the lease agreement between the Defendants during these 
proceedings does not bear on the issue of severance damages. The possible termination of the 
lease does not, of itself, affect the fair market value of Defendants' property or the ability of the 
property to produce rental income in the future. Defendants' other arguments are each discussed 
below. 
1. Loss of Value from Diminished Access 
Defendants contend that reasonable access to defendants' property will be eliminated by 
the new construction, thereby reducing the fair market value of the remaining property. Plaintiff 
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(UDOT) properly relies on State v. Harvey Real Estate to support its position against 
Defendants' argument. In that case, Harvey Real Estate owned approximately 160 acres of land 
that abutted Highway 89, a major transportation route, on its western border. Similarly, 
approximately 85 feet of the northern boundary of the property abutted Old Mountain Road, 
which intersected with Highway 89 directly adjacent to the property's northwest corner. The 
Harvey property had direct access to Old Mountain Road at its northwest comer along the 
approximately 85 feet of frontage. From 1947 until 1999, the Harvey property also had access to 
Highway 89 through a wide-gated agricultural entrance approximately 1,000 feet to the south of 
the intersection. In 1999, UDOT closed the intersection and determined to build a frontage road 
that completely separated the Harvey property from Highway 89, eliminating direct access to the 
property from the highway by condemning a portion of the Harvey property. UDOT filed a 
Motion in Limine to preclude Harvey from presenting evidence at trial that the closure of the 
intersection would substantially decrease the value of the remaining property. The Utah 
Supreme Court affirmed this Court's holding granting the motion because Harvey could not 
show that "any damage sustained by the closure of the intersection [had] been caused by the 
severance of its land." State v. Harvey Real Estate, 57 P.3d 1088, 1091. The court pointed out 
that Harvey was merely "seeking damages for devaluation of its property as a result of loss of 
access" to Highway 89 and that owners of neighboring properties may be similarly impacted by 
the closure of the intersection and would not be entitled to seek compensation. Id. at 1091. 
Other cases decided by the Utah Supreme Court have addressed the causal connection between 
the severance and the damage, see State v. Rozzelle. 120 P.2d 276, 277 (Utah 1941) (holding that 
the loss must "flow from either the taking of the strip of condemnee's land or from the nature of 
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the construction upon that strip"); Utah Dep't of Transp. v. D'Ambrosio. 743 P.2d 1220, 1222 
(Utah 19S7) (holding that "[severance damages are those caused by the taking of a portion of the 
parcel of property where the taking or the construction of the improvement on that pari causes 
injury to that portion of the property not taken"), and a landowner's right of access to his 
property, see Hampton v. State, 445 P.2d 708, 710-711 (Utah 1968) (holding that the right of 
reasonable access does not include "any right in and to existing public traffic on the highway, or 
any right to have such traffic pass by one's abutting property"). 
Similar to Harvey, where the devaluation of property arose from loss of access to 
Highway 89, the loss of value Defendants claim will arise from the reconstruction project on the 
Highway89/Shepard Lane intersection is a result of loss of the public's access to Arby's from 
Highway 89 and does not flow from either the taking of 0.048 acres of Defendants' property or 
from the nature of the construction on that part of property. Neighbors around Arby's whose 
property is not taken will suffer the same loss of access by the public to their businesses and will 
not be entitled to seek compensation. The public still has available routes that provide 
reasonable access to Arby's from Shepard Lane itself and also from exits from Highway 89 
located one-half mile from Arby's. Because reasonable access to Arby's exists, Defendants 
cannot say the damage to their property resulting from decreased traffic was caused by the 
severance of their land and are therefore precluded from presenting evidence of devaluation of 
their property resulting from the diminished access to their property. 
Defendants seek to distinguish Harvey from the present matter on the grounds that 
Defendants' property is used for commercial purposes and is located in a commercial area. 
However, Defendants' cite no cases supporting the distinction between commercial property and 
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other types of property. In fact, the court in State v. Rozzelle. 120 P.2d 276, 277 (Utah 1941) 
made no distinction with commercial property when it denied severance damages to the owner of 
a gasoline station for loss of business. Defendants also claim that the property taken from them 
is more integral to the reconstruction project and therefore the causal connection between the 
taking and the damage to the property is more direct. But Defendants seem to misconstrue the 
causal connection issue by focusing on the need for the taking rather than focusing on the actual 
cause of the damage, which was the loss of access to their property as explained above. 
2. Loss of View from Highway 
Article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution provides that "[pjrivate property shall not be 
taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." Defendants allege that the change 
in grade of U.S. Highway 89, which takes away Arby's eastern view and the ability of potential 
customers to view Arby's property and signs, is compensable. When part of a parcel of land has 
been acquired by eminent domain, some jurisdictions have allowed the jury to consider evidence 
of reduced market value of the remaining land caused by an obstruction of view from the 
owner's property while other jurisdictions have precluded it and denied compensation for 
obstruction of view. See generally Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Eminent Domain: 
Compensability of Loss of View from Owner's Property-State Cases. 25 A.L.R. 4th 671 (1981). 
Those jurisdictions that have allowed compensation for obstruction of view have rested their 
decision on the theory that owners of property own an easement of view from their property that 
can only be taken with just compensation or on a showing that the fair market value of the 
property has decreased as a result of the taking. See Utah State Rd. Comm'n v. Miya, 526 P.2d 
926, 929 (Utah 1974); Bramson v. Berea. 293 NE2d 577 (Ohio 1971). 
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In Miya, the Utah Supreme Court held that an easement of view is a property right (hat 
cannot be taken without just compensation even if the obstruction of view is caused by a proper 
highway use (some jurisdictions that recognize an easement of view nevertheless deny recovery 
when the view is obstructed by a proper highway use, 2A Nichols on Eminent Domain § 
6.11 [2], 6-1 SO (3d ed. 1997)). Miya, 526 P.2d at 929. The court in Mjya also hints that "special 
and peculiar" injuries, apart from recognized property rights, suffered by landowners may be 
compensable. Id. Plaintiff argues that Defendants' loss of view does not fit under the category 
of "special and peculiar" injury and is therefore not compensable as severance damages. 
However, the damage caused by the obstruction of view need not fit into the "special and 
peculiar" category of Miya since an easement of view is a compensable, appurtenant property 
right in and of itself. See Id. 
Miya is distinguishable, however, from the case at bar in that the loss of visibility in Miya 
arose from an elevated highway built within the existing right-of-way on the land taken from the 
condemnee. Because the loss of view in the case at bar arises from construction on property not 
taken from Defendants, although some property was taken from Defendants, this Court's view is 
that the loss in value to the property occasioned by the obstruction of view is not compensable. 
"Where the loss of visibility results from an improvement of or on land that was not taken from 
the claimant, such as on an abutting highway or on land taken from another, most courts have 
found loss of visibility not compensable." Tracy A. Bateman, Annotation, Eminent Domain: 
Compensability of Loss of Visibility of Owner's Property, 7 A.L.R. 5th 113 (1992); see also 
People ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works v. Wasserman. 50 Cal. Rptr. 95 (1st Dist. 1966) (recognizing 
the settled rule of an easement of reasonable view, the court held that any impairment of the view 
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of the landowners pioperty was not a compensable item of severance damages since the 
improvement causing such loss of uew was not located on the piopeity taken from the 
landowner). People ex lei Dep't of Pub Works v Becker, 69 Cal Rptr 110 (4th Dist 1968) 
(lefusing to giant severance damages when the obstiuclion of view was not caused by the 
improvement to the property taken), 8,960 Square Feet v State, DOT & Public Facilities. 806 
P2d 843, 846 (1991 Alaska) (holding that "a pioperty owner has no right to an unobstructed line 
of vision to his property from anywheie off of his property, absent an easement of some sort"); 
Filler v Minot, 281 NW2d 237 (ND 1979) (holding that although landowners were allowed 
compensation for loss of light of view fiom their property, that principle did not extend to create 
a compensable right to be viewed from the abutting highway) Furthermore, the Supreme Court 
of Utah, in Harvey, held that Section 78-34-10 of Utah Code Annotated "gives a landowner the 
right to present evidence of damages caused by the construction of the improvement made on the 
severedprope? ty" Harvey, 57 P 3d at 1090 (emphasis added) The court's reasoning in Harvey 
that owners of neighboring properties to the condemnee, who would not be entitled to 
compensation, would be similarly impacted by the closure of the intersection is also relevant in 
considering the obstruction of view of Defendants' property. Defendants' neighbors will suffer 
the same loss of visibility to their own property as Defendants themselves Because Defendants 
do not allege a loss of visibility of their property from construction done on land taken from 
them, they are piecluded fiom introducing evidence of a decline m the market value of their 
property caused by loss of visibility 
3. Devaluation Resulting from Zoning Requirements 
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Defendants argue that the inability to comply with city zoning ordinances will also 
impact the fair market value of their property. An existing zoning ordinance is generally held to 
be a proper matter for consideration in a suit for the condemnation of property for the purpose of 
determining the actual market value of land in measuring damages. See State by Rd. Comm'n v. 
Jacobs. 397 P.2d 463 (Utah 1964); see also In re Old Riverhead Rd. CR 31 in Southhampton. 
Suffolk County. N.Y., 264 N.Y.S.2d 162 (N.Y. Spec. Term 1965) (awarding severance damages 
to a landowner in the amount required to bring the remaining land into conformance with zoning 
laws, the violation of which resulted from the government's taking of a portion of his property); 
People ex rel Dep't Pub. Works, v. Investors Diversified Servs.. Inc.. 68 Cal. Rptr. 663 (2d Dist. 
1968) (holding that the total effect of the local zoning laws must be considered in arriving at the 
appropriate measure of compensation in an eminent domain action). 
Defendants allege that the taking of their property in this case will adversely impact the 
fair market value of the property due to an ordinance of Farmington City that requires a ten-foot 
green space around parking and service areas. Such diminution in value caused by the 
necessitated reconstruction to bring the remaining property into conformance with the city 
ordinance subsequent to the taking is properly classified as severance damages, and evidence 
thereof should not be precluded in court. 
RULING 
Summary judgment is granted when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The court 
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must examine the evidence in "a light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment." 
Hunt v. Hunt, 785 P.2d 414, 415 (Utah 1990). Based on the foregoing analysis, Defendants' 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted only to the extent that evidence of severance 
damages resulting from any costs required to bring Defendants' property into conformance with 
local city ordinances, the nonconformance of which are caused by the taking of Defendants' 
property, will be properly admissible. 
In accordance with the decision above on Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, Plaintiffs Motion in Limine is granted in part and denied in part. The Motion in 
Limine is granted insofar that evidence tending to show a decline in the market value of 
Defendants' property caused by the redirection of traffic over Shepard Lane and any resulting 
loss in business arising from the same shall be precluded. Similarly, evidence of loss of visibility 
of Defendants' property caused by construction not on Defendants' property and that tends to 
reduce its market value shall be precluded. Plaintiffs Motion in Limine is denied insofar that 
evidence of severance damages arising from any costs required for conformance to city 
ordinances after the taking has occurred that are caused by the taking is admissible. 
Dated May 22\ ,2003. 
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